Pod pokroviteljstvom Jeryija Buzeka, predsednika Evropskega parlamenta, je 29. in 30. aprila 2010 v Berlinu potekala mednarodna konferenca z naslovom "Evropa se spominja za prihodnost".
Konferenca sodi v serijo dogodkov, s katerimi naj bi Vzhodna in Zahodna Evropa poskušala zapreti poglavja o različnih totalitarizmih iz svoje preteklosti. Tako kot ostale dogodke je tudi konferenco "Evropa se spominja za prihodnost" organiziralo Društvo za razvoj kulture dialoga v razširjeni Evropi.
Po konferenci so organizatorji izdali zbornik s prispevki sodelujočih. Prispevek dr. Milana Zvera lahko preberete tukaj: WHAT SHOULD WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE TOTALITARIAN EXPERIENCE?
Na tej povezavi pa najdete povzetek konference s slikami.
Ob robu konference je dr. Milan Zver skupaj z mag. Andrejo Valič objavil prispevek z naslovom Usodna privlačnost "magičnega" totalitarizma v tedniku Demokracija: PRENESI DOKUMENT
Pod pokroviteljstvom Jeryija Buzeka, predsednika Evropskega parlamenta, je 29. in 30. aprila 2010 v Berlinu potekala mednarodna konferenca z naslovom "Evropa se spominja za prihodnost".
Konferenca sodi v serijo dogodkov, s katerimi naj bi Vzhodna in Zahodna Evropa poskušala zapreti poglavja o različnih totalitarizmih iz svoje preteklosti. Tako kot ostale dogodke je tudi konferenco "Evropa se spominja za prihodnost" organiziralo Društvo za razvoj kulture dialoga v razširjeni Evropi.
Po konferenci so organizatorji izdali zbornik s prispevki sodelujočih. Prispevek dr. Milana Zvera lahko preberete tukaj: WHAT SHOULD WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE TOTALITARIAN EXPERIENCE?
Na tej povezavi pa najdete povzetek konference s slikami.
Ob robu konference je dr. Milan Zver skupaj z mag. Andrejo Valič objavil prispevek z naslovom Usodna privlačnost "magičnega" totalitarizma v tedniku Demokracija: PRENESI DOKUMENT
WHAT SHOULD WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE TOTALITARIAN EXPERIENCE?
Is the nowadays stagnation of democracy leading us to a new totalitarianism?
I. Introduction
This paper is based upon at least three suppositions: firstly, we can not understand the present and much less anticipate the future, if we ignore the past, secondly, the transition to democracy cannot be explained without considering the cultural contexts, and thirdly, we will not resolve the emergence of a new totalitarianism, if we do not take measures.
The world is overwhelmed by a general crisis. The financial and economic crises go hand in hand with the social and political crises. Before the structural crisis appears in the political field (when the institutions do not or can not operate), the germs occur in the sphere of culture, as a crisis of legitimacy, as a doubt about the viability of democratic institutions, resulting in a fall of their support. The whole process was already seen in the twenties and thirties of the 20. century. In a large part of the world it concluded with the 'murder' of democracy and the victory of totalitarianisms of the twentieth century.
Recently we celebrated the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The American social thought guru Fukuyama experienced the fall very euphorically, as the end of the last totalitarianism, the victory of liberal democracy and even as the end of history. In fact, a new wave of democratic energy broke out and trashed communism into the dustbin of history. A new, democratic consciousness, a new culture has arisen; mass democratic movements and new political elites have developed.
But later the enthusiasm for democracy in the post-communist countries decreased a lot, despite the undeniable economic development. We need to ask ourselves some important questions: Why for example is the poll in these countries consistently lower than in stable democracies? Why is the public support for the main attributes of democracy such as parliaments and political parties constantly decreasing? Why the decomposing of the communist mentality and structures has been happening so slowly? Why does so much corruption appear these countries? Why do they face so much crime and sociopath phenomena? Why are the citizens passive, apathetic, anaemic?
This is probably also due to the fact that political and civil culture of individuals is not yet strengthened enough to more permanently influence their more active (democratic) posture. It is not sufficiently developed, firstly, on the opinion level, which reflects the declarative attitude of people to selected problems and issues (e.g. the relationship of the democratic political system, main institutions and political ideas); secondly, on the evaluation level, where we give sense to certain phenomena from the perspective of being good or not good; and thirdly, on the behavioural level, which reflects the degree of political (non)participation or activity in politics and public affairs.
The democratic potential and courage that burst out when the Berlin Wall fell and the communism started to fall apart soon dried up and therefore the transition to democracy lasts much longer than we all have expected. We will try to explain this later, but before that let us have a look at the recent Slovenian history.
For Slovenia as well as for the rest of Europe it is considered that communism has not failed on its own, but was overthrown by the crowds. However, without the exceptional civil courage of some individuals the outcome would not have been so favourable. But still, has it been favourable enough?
II. The Slovenian case – from state terrorism to brain washing
The Slovenians are one of the few nations who have experienced three totalitarian regimes: Fascism, National Socialism and Communism. Most adverse consequences were left by Communism, which could be divided at least into two periods considering the terror and violence.
The first one is the period of revolutionary terrorism (named like this by dr. Jože Pučnik). This period lasted a few years after the communist government take-over. The regime carried out physical liquidations and in this context genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and other drastic violations of human rights and freedoms. In this period the human life really had no price. In addition to mass killings this period is characterized by massive political emigration, labour and correctional camps and homes, dispossessions of basic civil rights, denunciations at every step, confiscations of assets of the existing or imaginary opposition, rapid trials, validity of revolutionary law, which was possible only in the conditions of a police state and society (repressive functions of the prosecution, judiciary and police were even nationalized to create the so called integral security system). The civil society was stamped out, a system that was driven by fear, was accompanied by complete political socialization.
The second period is characterized by continuing of ideological engineering. The authority clearly started to recognize that rough violence, drastic violation of rights and terror cannot permanently ensure their authority and system. Virtually all structures were included into the ideological engineering: the educational system, media, companies, local communities and other social structures. In addition to the victory over the Fascism they tried to solve their legitimate problems in the so called third channels in order to prove their authenticity and nonalignment in the existing blocks. We can talk about a structural 'surrogatism', as they introduced 'original' substitutes of basic social and political institutions and even of the 'real' Soviet system and its planned economy, one-party system or state property. This way, for example, in Slovenia instead of market economy they established a system of associated labour, which was based on reaching agreements between economic actors, and not on the market. Instead of a representative political system and free mandate they introduced a delegate system with an imperative mandate; instead of the parliamentary party pluralism they introduced the assembly, non-party pluralism with socio-political organizations or the so called non-party pluralism. Instead of free secondary schools they introduced secondary-oriented education with a strong ideological transfusion into the formal and implementing curriculum. In short, in addition to fear, which they produced, they paid more and more attention to proper design of the mentality of people.
By this means the communist authorities wanted to develop a new self-governing socialist society and culture, which as such could not fulfil successfully. However, I think that yet a latent undemocratic culture established and maintained quite long even in the period of democracy.
Considering this as the reality, how can we then explain the democratic outbreak in the eighties? In any case, the new democratic culture was emerging in the value centre of culture, in the value system. In Slovenia the civil courage and the new political culture mainly exercised on the outside opinion level, at the level of beliefs already in the period of liberalization in the eighties, which were still under the totalitarian regime. These new beliefs also influenced the behavioural level, which resulted in mass protests against the government and for freedom and democracy. But the question is whether the new, democratic culture 'got' deep enough into the value form right at the core of culture. Certainly, but I am convinced that not enough! It is known that the democratic potential of the nineties weakened when Slovenia has already established basic democratic institutions. If there were profound changes in the value forms towards democracy, the transition would have been much more successful.
The reasons for this are therefore grounded in the old regime, as the systematic dissemination of fear and terror from the public space gradually imprinted deep into the psyche of people. Also the political enculturation with its main holders – the political organizations, schools, media, companies etc., has affected the mental political 'laziness' or even mutilation, which shows, as Pučnik says, in disintegrative civil courage. Even more, sociopath phenomena such as corruption, crime, murder and suicide appear. People are no longer prepared to do something more for others, to resolve common problems for higher quality standards of living. They let others to decide, for example, various self-styled corporate bodies. A referendum, people's initiative or anything like that became "obscene". People do no longer scourge failures of the authorities, leading to transition, and do not reveal patterns of totalitarian sociability which as remnants of the past maintain and reproduce themselves in the new democratic times. They scourge left, right and centre. Apathy is the ultimate goal of all types of regimes having problems with democratic legitimacy. Dissidents almost no longer exist.
A decade ago dr. Pučnik also found that transition was progressing poorly and democratic institutions were functioning slowly precisely because of mental deterioration. Therefore a few years ago he believed that the path to normalcy will be long and arduous.
III. The fall of the so called Enlightenment project and the ascent of totalitarianisms of the 20th century
The political modernism started three centuries ago, when the Enlightenment programme rejected the theocratic programme of profane authorities legitimisation. Politics became earthly and anthropocentric. Man became a source of power legitimisation and thus placed in the centre of the community living.
But the followers of the Enlightenment and modernists were aware that a man is not the Absolute as God is, that he is not worth full confidence in advance. Therefore in his social and political structures particular solutions preventing abuse of power were integrated. These safeguards are reflected by the concepts of the social contract, the separation of powers, the democratic elections, the rule of law and the preferential state of rights and freedoms of citizens within the system. The political modernism has not only established a modern system of self-legitimisation of authorities, but also other institutional conditions for normal functioning of the society, namely the market economy, democracy, rule of law, mass school, mass media etc.
In the 20th century the holders of totalitarian projects demolished all these liberal structural assumptions of the Enlightenment project and created sizable niches on the map for a longer period of time where the free society and free individual were not able to enthrone. Different types of the Fascists, Nazis, Communists and Authoritarian Corporatists, new players on the political map of the 20th century, used all means to enforce the new social orders on their own merits and flavours. And if we analyze their doctrines and practice, they have more in similarities than differences. The fact is that they defeated democracy and limited it to the part of the Western Civilization living in similar global social circumstances as we do today.
IV. Can the totalitarianism after crisis of democracy happen again?
If we use to forget, history repeating really is our fate. It is known that the geo-strategic image of the world really has changed in the last twenty years. We experienced one or two strong waves of democracy, but expectations that the world will become one-dimensional, harmonious, democratic and peaceful have proved to be too utopian. On the contrary, even at the global level harder and harder collisions of the multicultural and multi-centric world can be detected. Jacques Delors, for example, correctly anticipated, that a spark of future conflicts will sooner arise due to cultural rather than economic or ideological differences and conflicts. At one occasion Vaclav Havel also said, that the cultural conflicts are increasing, and are more dangerous than ever in the history. Our civilization is losing the economic, political, military, technological and demographic power, which brings an additional bad sign for democracy. On the other side of democracy anti-democratic movements such as Nationalism, Religious Fanaticism and Terrorism in particular that seriously undermine existing democratic societies and block the years before automatic process of spreading global democracy are reinforcing in the global scale. The Moscow police beat citizens, asking for more political freedoms. In Slovenia and some other post-communist countries old symbols and myths have been brought to revival.
The twentieth century was a century of ideologies, which as projects left enormous consequences, particularly within most affected nations living under totalitarianism for decades. Ideologies are, therefore, without perspective, totalitarian forms of sociability should be dead in the minds of people long ago. But it is not like that. It can be seen and felt on every step we make.
Researches show that the enthusiasm for democracy is decreasing and that democracy fell into a recession, that it made a step backwards (The Economist). The problem is particularly acute in the post-communist countries. People have less and less confidence in democracy and its institutions, particularly in the Parliament and political parties. The participation in elections and other political activities and organizations is getting lower and lower.
Instead of the active citizen the apathetic citizen is becoming increasingly visible in the given nondemocratic climate. The apathetic citizen is unable and does not see the opportunities for active involvement in the public dialogue, he is confused and disappointed, and he feels like an angry outsider, he is suspicious of everyone involved in the politics. More and more the politics seems to act as a part of a conspiracy to him, so he avoids it and seeks individual chances for survival. In this context, we are becoming a society of Q-lands, Europarks, Cityparks and other urban shopping centres, where otherwise indifferent individuals live out their anthropological mission as buyers and sellers who have benefits of calculations, and comfort presents their life essence. Such mentality is also monitored in democracy, which is becoming more and more commercial and advertising, where individual actors compete against each other and achieve a similar visual effect in citizens as advertisements. Because they are designed as advertisements they have to follow the demands of advertising. You let yourself be convinced; then you buy and spend. And so on till next time, until the next ad.
V. Strengthening the fragile democracy
History teaches us that democracy was losing with the economic and social crisis which encourages imagination and exploration of a more efficient social order. If citizens feel they do not gain anything from democracy, they will easily take farewell. Moreover, in every society, especially in transitional societies, there is a part of the culture, which is not democratically oriented and where someone could implement totalitarian or authoritarian structures.
So what can be done democracy not to remain so fragile, to strengthen it or even prevent the revitalization of totalitarianisms or the emergence of new ones?
1. Education for democracy: it is necessary to consolidate the democratic public opinion and, what is even more important, to consolidate and develop the democratic values. It seems that the democratic political culture is the strongest guarantee for maintaining and ensuring "sustainable development" of every democracy.
2. Democracy has to be structurally improved: we have to provide greater transparency of democratic processes and opportunities for greater involvement of citizens. Not only at the local or national level. Democracy rescues itself from the national contexts entrapment. It is also necessary to develop real democracy at the EU level and increase the European dimension, especially as Europe symbolizes the values of democracy and fairness.
I. Introduction
This paper is based upon at least three suppositions: firstly, we can not understand the present and much less anticipate the future, if we ignore the past, secondly, the transition to democracy cannot be explained without considering the cultural contexts, and thirdly, we will not resolve the emergence of a new totalitarianism, if we do not take measures.
The world is overwhelmed by a general crisis. The financial and economic crises go hand in hand with the social and political crises. Before the structural crisis appears in the political field (when the institutions do not or can not operate), the germs occur in the sphere of culture, as a crisis of legitimacy, as a doubt about the viability of democratic institutions, resulting in a fall of their support. The whole process was already seen in the twenties and thirties of the 20. century. In a large part of the world it concluded with the 'murder' of democracy and the victory of totalitarianisms of the twentieth century.
Recently we celebrated the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The American social thought guru Fukuyama experienced the fall very euphorically, as the end of the last totalitarianism, the victory of liberal democracy and even as the end of history. In fact, a new wave of democratic energy broke out and trashed communism into the dustbin of history. A new, democratic consciousness, a new culture has arisen; mass democratic movements and new political elites have developed.
But later the enthusiasm for democracy in the post-communist countries decreased a lot, despite the undeniable economic development. We need to ask ourselves some important questions: Why for example is the poll in these countries consistently lower than in stable democracies? Why is the public support for the main attributes of democracy such as parliaments and political parties constantly decreasing? Why the decomposing of the communist mentality and structures has been happening so slowly? Why does so much corruption appear these countries? Why do they face so much crime and sociopath phenomena? Why are the citizens passive, apathetic, anaemic?
This is probably also due to the fact that political and civil culture of individuals is not yet strengthened enough to more permanently influence their more active (democratic) posture. It is not sufficiently developed, firstly, on the opinion level, which reflects the declarative attitude of people to selected problems and issues (e.g. the relationship of the democratic political system, main institutions and political ideas); secondly, on the evaluation level, where we give sense to certain phenomena from the perspective of being good or not good; and thirdly, on the behavioural level, which reflects the degree of political (non)participation or activity in politics and public affairs.
The democratic potential and courage that burst out when the Berlin Wall fell and the communism started to fall apart soon dried up and therefore the transition to democracy lasts much longer than we all have expected. We will try to explain this later, but before that let us have a look at the recent Slovenian history.
For Slovenia as well as for the rest of Europe it is considered that communism has not failed on its own, but was overthrown by the crowds. However, without the exceptional civil courage of some individuals the outcome would not have been so favourable. But still, has it been favourable enough?
Dr Milan Zver